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Genetic Privacy in the “Big Biology” Era:  
The “Autonomous” Human Subject  
MARILYN CECH† 
What do the Golden State Killer, the Havasupai Tribe, and Henrietta Lacks have in common? 
None of these individuals gave informed consent for the particular research uses of their genetic 
material. Biotechnological advancements have made what was previously unimaginable—just 
decades or even years ago—a common reality. Unfortunately, the law evolves at a much slower 
rate than science. Thus, it may take a radical philosophical shift to make way for new legal 
frameworks that can provide adequate protections that keep up with scientific progress and 
withstand the test of time. Currently, a person’s “bio-unique data,” namely a person’s biological 
material and genetic information, is neither protected as “personally identifiable information” 
nor “protected health information” under United States federal law. Therefore, our recent 
breakthroughs in DNA genotyping and sequencing leave individuals particularly vulnerable. This 
Note uses a discussion of the laws regulating research on human subjects, a group which the 
world has unanimously agreed must give informed consent, to propose a shift in privacy 
regulation towards a framework more equipped to handle the new challenges of genetic privacy. 
  
 
 † J.D. Candidate 2019, University of California, Hastings College of the Law; Senior Production Editor, 
Hastings Law Journal. Thank you to Tanya Wei and all of the Industry Contract Division at University of 
California, San Francisco, for providing the inspiration and guidance to begin this Note, and to Professor Lois 
Weithorn, Professor of Bioethics and the Law, for her invaluable feedback throughout the writing process. 
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The voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential.1 
INTRODUCTION 
GEDmatch hosts a public online genealogy database intended to help 
relatives find each other through similarities in their genetic profiles.2 Users of 
the platform are required to create a profile and check a box certifying that they 
are authorized to upload the deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) sample because it is 
either their own, they are the legal guardian of the person to whom the DNA 
belongs, or they have “obtained authorization” from the person to whom the 
DNA belongs.3 This check-the-box certification did not prevent investigators 
from fabricating a profile to gain access to the platform and entering a DNA 
sample obtained from a crime scene decades earlier in the hopes of generating 
leads in a cold case.4 GEDmatch then unwittingly provided the undercover 
investigators with a family tree that identified over one hundred potential 
relatives of the source of the DNA sample.5  
After pursuing a couple of false leads, police eventually narrowed in on 
Joseph James DeAngelo, Jr., a former police officer who was the right age and 
had geographic ties to the communities affected by the “Golden State Killer.”6 
While most are glad to see the alleged twelve-time murderer and fifty-time rapist 
who terrorized neighborhoods throughout California7 behind bars, these events 
illustrate just one way in which a person’s genetic privacy can be infringed.  
Many people unintentionally expose themselves to the risk of DNA privacy 
breaches, for example, by leaving DNA at crime scenes,8 by using direct-to-
consumer DNA test at home kits,9 or by donating tissue samples to science. This 
Note focuses on the recent threats to privacy using tissue sample donors as an 
example. These participants in human subject research should enjoy the 
protections of informed consent but are often uninformed as to the extent to 
which their genetic information may be used and scientists’ new ability to re-
 
 1. THE NUREMBERG CODE (1947), reprinted in BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., BIOETHICS: HEALTH CARE 
LAW AND ETHICS 506, 507 (7th ed. 2013). 
 2. Your DNA Is Not Your Own: How the Golden State Killer Hunt Reveals the Limits of Medical Privacy, 
ADVISORY BOARD (Apr. 30, 2018, 11:00 AM), https://www.advisory.com/daily-briefing/2018/04/30/dna. 
 3. Id.  
 4. Id. 
 5. Susan Scutti, What the Golden State Killer Case Means for Your Genetic Privacy, CNN (May 1, 2018, 
12:01 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/04/27/health/golden-state-killer-genetic-privacy/index.html. 
 6. Benjamin Oreskes et al., False Starts in Search for Golden State Killer Reveal the Pitfalls of DNA 
Testing, L.A. TIMES (May 4, 2018, 5:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-golden-state-killer-
dna-20180504-story.html. 
 7. See Scutti, supra note 5. 
 8. See Elizabeth R. Pike, Securing Sequences: Ensuring Adequate Protections for Genetic Samples in the 
Age of Big Data, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 1977, 2019 (2016). See generally Jessica D. Gabel, Probable Cause from 
Probable Bonds: A Genetic Tattle Tale Based on Familial DNA, 21 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 3 (2010) 
(discussing the privacy implications of familial searches by law enforcement within criminal DNA databases). 
 9. See generally Deepthy Kishore, Test at Your Own Risk: Your Genetic Report Card and the Direct-to-
Consumer Duty to Secure Informed Consent, 59 EMORY L.J. 1553 (2010) (proposing that courts impose a duty 
on genetic testing companies to give warnings to their customers akin to a physician’s duty of informed consent).  
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identify anonymized samples. Further, this Note grapples with the question of 
whether increased transparency in scientific research would benefit individuals, 
and the community as a whole, or unduly burden scientific advancement.  
Science is outpacing the legislature’s awareness of and ability to pass 
appropriate regulations to manage the privacy risks facing both willing and 
unwitting10 research participants. While scientists are revolutionizing medicine 
with the discovery of the human genome,11 ethicists and the scientific 
community are beginning to question whether the escalating costs to the 
individual will continue to be worth the benefit to the community. Perhaps 
though, the question is not whether community welfare should be valued over 
individual autonomy, but whether society will recognize that human dignity, as 
a philosophical concept and fundamental right, requires respect for both the 
individual and humanity. If the “big data era” is indeed the “post-privacy age,” 
where privacy is more of a myth than a reality, and the free exchange of 
information has valuable benefits,12 it is our conception of human dignity, not 
individual autonomy, that needs to be safeguarded. 
Universal principles of bioethics dictate that human experimentation 
requires the express, voluntary, and informed consent of human subjects.13 In 
the context of human subject research, “informed consent” refers to participants 
giving permission to research subjects only after they understand the potential 
consequences of participation in the study, including any risks, benefits, or 
waivers of rights.14 One big risk that researchers and participants alike tend to 
underestimate is breach of information privacy. Traditionally, and as the law 
developed, society was more concerned with cruel treatment by physical abuses 
to the bodies of fellow human beings.15  
 
 10. When a person goes to the doctor to have blood drawn or another medical procedure that requires the 
collection of a tissue sample, the leftover portions not needed for testing may be discarded or, as is often the 
case, may be retained in a biobank and made available for use by researchers. Pike, supra note 8, at 1988, 1992 
(discussing the common misunderstanding of “medical waste” and suits against Texas and Minnesota brought 
by parents concerned with the unconsented research use of newborn bloodspot samples after mandatory 
screening for genetic diseases). While anonymous tissue samples used to pose little risk to individual privacy, 
that is certainly no longer the case with new DNA technology. See, e.g., Melissa Gymrek et al., Identifying 
Personal Genomes by Surname Inference, 339 SCIENCE 321, 321–24 (2013) (re-identifying the individuals who 
anonymously donated DNA samples to the HapMap project). 
 11. Edward S. Dove, Biobanks, Data Sharing, and the Drive for a Global Privacy Governance Framework, 
43 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 675, 678 (2015) (“The [Human Genome Project] revealed more than 99% of the complex 
structure of the human genome through the successful sequencing and publication of its complete sequence.”). 
 12. See ANDREAS WEIGEND, DATA FOR THE PEOPLE: HOW TO MAKE OUR POST-PRIVACY ECONOMY WORK 
FOR YOU 6 (2017) (advocating for increased transparency and agency for individuals in the use of their data 
because true privacy is no longer feasible in the age of big data).  
 13. See OFFICE OF THE SEC’Y, THE NAT’L COMM’N FOR THE PROT. OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL 
& BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, THE BELMONT REPORT: ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR THE 
PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF RESEARCH (1979), https://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/sites/default/files/the-
belmont-report-508c_FINAL.pdf [hereinafter BELMONT REPORT] (applying its general ethics principles to the 
requirement of informed consent). 
 14. What Is Informed Consent?, NIH NAT’L LIBR. MED. (Feb. 19, 2019), https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/primer/ 
testing/informedconsent.  
 15. See infra Subpart I.A.1. 
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While the medical field has long recognized the sensitive and personal 
nature of health information, new research practices, medical initiatives, and 
biotechnology expand the categories of information that are sensitive and 
personal to unique individuals.16 Recent breakthroughs in genetic research, such 
as “genome sequencing,” generating code for the entire strand of DNA, have 
shown that a person’s cells have the ability to reveal large amounts of “bio-
unique information.”17 Additionally, advancements in technology make this 
information more easily accessible and easily shared;18 thus, it is more 
vulnerable than it has ever been. Indeed, ensuring health information privacy 
may no longer be possible.19  
Recent controversies illustrate that the framework of privacy laws in the 
United States is ill-equipped to confront the realities of the big data era, in which 
the collection, use, and exchange of a person’s bio-unique data is widespread.20 
While the problem has not been overlooked, proposals for new methods and 
regulations to preserve individual autonomy and protect privacy either threaten 
to burden the exciting new path of medical discovery or offer little practical 
improvement.21 The European Union (EU), however, has a privacy framework 
that is more comprehensive that includes informational privacy, recognizes data 
privacy as a fundamental right, provides stricter regulations for sharing personal 
information without consent, and has harsher penalties for data misuse.22 The 
EU’s data subject rights model embraces the rights to “personal dignity” and 
“informational self-determination,”23 fundamental philosophies that make it a 
better starting point for the future of privacy regulation.24 The United States must 
recognize the inadequacies in its privacy-informed consent framework in this 
 
 16. See Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, 82 Fed. Reg. 7149, 7151 (Jan. 19, 2017) 
(codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 46 (2018)). 
 17. Id. at 7151, 7163–64. 
 18. Id. at 7151. 
 19. Jeantine E. Lunshof et al., From Genetic Privacy to Open Consent, 9 NATURE 406, 406 (2008) 
(“Developments in both medical informatics and bioinformatics show that the guarantee of absolute privacy and 
confidentiality is not a promise that medical and scientific researchers can deliver any longer.”). 
 20. See Wash. Univ. v. Catalona, 490 F.3d 667 (8th Cir. 2007) (ruling against patients who wanted to 
transfer their donated samples with the investigator to another university to continue the desired research); Moore 
v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990) (holding that patient did not have a property right in 
his tissue after removal, but that physician breached his disclosure obligations in failing to disclose preexisting 
research and economic interests prior to obtaining consent to perform the medical procedure). 
 21. Jocelyn Kaiser, Update: U.S. Abandons Controversial Consent Proposal on Using Human Research 
Samples, SCI. MAG. (Jan. 18, 2017, 4:15 PM), http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2017/01/update-us-abandons-
controversial-consent-proposal-using-human-research-samples. 
 22. LOTHAR DETERMANN, CALIFORNIA PRIVACY LAW: PRACTICAL GUIDE AND COMMENTARY U.S. 
FEDERAL AND CALIFORNIA LAW § 1-5:4 (Joni N. McNeal ed., 3d ed. 2018). 
 23. James Q. Whitman, Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113 YALE L.J. 1151, 
1161 (2004). 
 24. But see Tal Z. Zarzky, Incompatible: The GDPR in the Age of Big Data, 47 SETON HALL L. REV. 995, 
996 (2017) (arguing that the GDPR is utterly incompatible with the Big Data era, that it will soon be irrelevant 
in the EU, and that it will stall innovation in Europe without providing its citizens greater privacy protection).  
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age of advancing biotechnology to enable its laws to evolve as science 
progresses.  
Part I introduces the doctrine of informed consent, discusses its evolution, 
and recognizes some problems in current practice. Part II discusses the 
prominent U.S. federal privacy protections for health information and compares 
its patchwork of laws to the data privacy framework in the EU, particularly its 
new General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). Part III examines how the 
fundamental differences in privacy philosophies between the EU and the United 
States better situate the EU for controlling information privacy. Finally, Part IV 
advocates for the treatment of health data as sensitive personal data, proposes 
the adoption of an EU data subject right privacy model, and recommends 
embracing technology and a big data solution with dynamic consent to address 
emerging privacy concerns.  
I.  INFORMED CONSENT 
A.  THE DOCTRINE OF INFORMED CONSENT 
Informed consent necessitates that a human research subject authorizes the 
anticipated medical procedure or research study prior to its performance and 
requires that the permission be given voluntarily and with knowledge of the 
facts, risks, and benefits to the individual human research subject.25 This is true 
in cases where there is a risk of bodily harm to the research subject, as the 
doctrine developed historically, and also where there are information privacy 
risks.26 The idea that voluntary informed consent is a prerequisite to human 
experimentation is rooted in the bioethical principle of autonomy27 and has been 
immortalized by the Supreme Court’s reading of an individual’s fundamental 
right to privacy in the Fifth Amendment of United States Constitution.28 
1.  The Basis of Informed Consent in the United States 
The use of human subjects in biomedical research is invaluable. Yet, in 
practice, it is difficult to strike a balance between preserving the privacy rights 
of individual participants and minimizing administrative burdens on scientists, 
which impede scientific discoveries. Several ethical tragedies brought the 
concept of “informed consent” to the forefront of human subject research for the 
United States. Significantly, the Nuremberg Code of 1947 (the Code), also 
 
 25. What Is Informed Consent?, supra note 14. 
 26. Id.  
 27. See, e.g., Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914) (“Every human being of 
adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body . . . .”). 
 28. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (concluding that although privacy is not a right 
enumerated in the Constitution or the Bill of Rights, privacy is an overarching right created by the “penumbra” 
of enumerated rights that protect some aspect of privacy). 
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known as the “ten commandments of [human subject research]”29 or “the most 
important document in the history of the ethics of medical research,”30 was 
drafted in the aftermath of World War II during the Nuremberg War Crime 
Trials, in which Nazi doctors were charged with “conducting murderous and 
torturous human experiments in the concentration camps.”31 The Code declares: 
“The voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential.”32 It further 
explains that voluntary consent requires that the subject “have legal capacity to 
give consent,” “be able to exercise free power of choice,” and “have sufficient 
knowledge and comprehension of the elements of the subject matter involved as 
to enable him to make an understanding and enlightened decision.”33 
Additionally, the Code warns researchers against accepting consent that is not 
informed, that is, consent lacking “the nature, duration, and purpose of the 
experiment; the method and means by which it is to be conducted; all 
inconveniences and hazards reasonably to be expected; and the effects upon his 
health or person which may possibly come from his participation in the 
experiment.”34 
The first federal U.S. policy for the protection of human subjects was 
established in 1953 for research conducted at the National Institutes of Health 
Clinical Center (NIH) or receiving federal funding for the objective prospective 
review of proposed research.35 Then, following the publicity of the infamous 
Tuskegee Syphilis Study,36 the enactment of the National Research Act of 1974 
required the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare to codify its policy 
for the protection of human subjects and formed the National Commission for 
the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research to 
draft the Belmont Report.37 The Belmont Report identifies three broad ethical 
principles to guide the conduct for research of human subjects and under which 
 
 29. Kristine M. Severyn, The Nazi Doctors and the Nuremberg Code, 4 J. PHARMACY & L. 167, 167 (1995) 
(reviewing GEORGE J. ANNAS & MICHAEL A. GRODIN, THE NAZI DOCTORS AND THE NUREMBERG CODE: HUMAN 
RIGHTS IN HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION (1992)). 
 30. Evelyne Shuster, Fifty Years Later: The Significance of the Nuremberg Code, 337 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
1436, 1436 (1997). 
 31. Id. 
 32. THE NUREMBERG CODE, supra note 1, at 507. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. OFFICE OF EXTRAMURAL RESEARCH, NAT’L INSTS. HEALTH, PROTECTING HUMAN RESEARCH 
PARTICIPANTS 6 (2018), https://grants.nih.gov/sites/default/files/PHRP_Archived_Course_Materials_ 
English.pdf [hereinafter PROTECTING HUMAN RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS]. 
 36. In the Tuskegee Syphilis Study (1932–1972), the U.S. Public Health Service selected and studied four 
hundred poor black males from the small town of Tuskegee, Alabama who were infected with syphilis. Walter 
T. Champion, Jr., The Tuskegee Syphilis Study as a Paradigm for Illegal, Racist, and Unethical Human 
Experimentation, 37 S.U. L. REV. 231, 231–32 (2010). Rather than treating the infected men, researchers 
observed the men to study the progression of the disease. Id. Participants gave consent which was not informed 
believing that they were receiving free treatment for their participation in the study, when in fact treatment was 
withheld when it became available so that the study could continue without interruption. Id. 
 37. PROTECTING HUMAN RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS, supra note 35, at 7, 11. 
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to formulate, criticize, and interpret new rules.38 First, “respect for persons” 
mandates that individuals are treated as autonomous agents and states that all 
people are entitled to protection.39 Second, “beneficence” emphasizes that 
people are to be “treated in an ethical manner not only by respecting their 
decisions and protecting them from harm, but also by making efforts to secure 
their well-being.”40 And third, “justice” discusses balancing the burden and 
benefit to the research subject and distributing such burdens and benefits fairly 
to society as a whole.41 
2.  The Pre-2018 Federal Common Rule 
The ethical principles of the Nuremberg Code and the Belmont Report 
guided certain federal agencies to enact regulations to ensure the ethical 
treatment and protection of human subjects—namely the Department of Health 
and Human Services (HHS) Basic Policy for Protection of Human Research 
Subjects (the Common Rule)42 and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
Protections of Human Subjects.43 The Common Rule was published in 1981 by 
HHS and codified in separate regulations by fourteen additional federal 
departments and agencies.44 The Common Rule outlines the basic provisions for 
review of research proposals by institutional review boards, informed consent 
requirements, and ongoing review for compliance for federally funded studies.45  
Under the pre-2018 Common Rule, informed consent is required only if a 
particular study involves direct contact with a “human subject.”46 Human subject 
means “a living individual about whom an investigator (whether professional or 
student) obtains (1) Data through intervention or interaction with the individual, 
or (2) Identifiable private information.”47 “Private information must be 
individually identifiable (i.e., the identity of the subject is or may readily be 
ascertained by the investigator associated with the information) in order for 
obtaining the information to constitute research involving human subjects.”48  
Essentially, research that uses leftover tissue or data from prior research 
without information that identifies a particular person, does not involve direct 
contact or association with a person; thus is not “research involving human 
subjects.”49 Therefore, informed consent is typically not required before using 
or sharing a person’s bio-unique information as long as their identity cannot 
 
 38. BELMONT REPORT, supra note 13. 
 39. Id.  
 40. Id.  
 41. Id.  
 42. 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101–.124 (2009) (amended 2018). 
 43. 21 C.F.R. §§ 50.20–.27 (2009) (amended 2018). 
 44. See PROTECTING HUMAN RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS, supra note 35, at 8. 
 45. Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects (‘Common Rule’), OFF. HUM. RES. PROTECTIONS 
(Mar. 18, 2016), https://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/regulations-and-policy/regulations/common-rule/index.html.  
 46. 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(f) (2009) (subject to certain exceptions as provided in § 46.101). 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 49. Id. 
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“readily be ascertained.”50 This makes a person’s informational privacy 
particularly vulnerable because sharing de-identified data is a common practice 
among researchers. 
Notably, slight revisions have been made to these definitions “for 
clarity.”51 The definition of “human subject” replaced the term “data” with 
“information or biospecimens” and, in addition to “obtains,” added “uses, 
studies, analyzes, or generates.”52 Additionally, “identifiable” is now properly 
defined as part of two new defined term “identifiable private information” and 
“identifiable biospecimen” although retaining the language in “private 
information” quoted above.53 The gist of these changes was to include 
biospecimen in these definitions, a big (even if unintentional) step forward in 
acknowledging biospecimens as potentially identifiable.  
On the other hand, the addition of the word generates potentially brings a 
new situation within the reach of the Common Rule—secondary research where 
a researcher obtains de-identified data not subject to the Common Rule, such as 
an anonymous biospecimen, and through manipulation of the specimen 
generates identifiable data. Before this addition, it was unclear if a researcher in 
this situation would be subject to the regulations and certainly it would be 
impracticable to comply with obtaining informed consent. Researchers often 
side-stepped this uncertainty by including a provision in their Material/Data 
Transfer Contracts containing a promise not to reidentify the data obtained.  
Although the intent apparently was to keep the definitions substantively 
the same,54 it has yet to be seen what practical effect these changes will have on 
informed consent requirements and whether they will be interpreted in favor of 
increased privacy protections for subjects who traditionally were not considered 
“human subjects” but whose rights are increasingly implicated nonetheless. 
Informed consent has become a tool to allow people to voluntarily consent to 
privacy risks, but it has also become apparent that the scope of the doctrine is 
both too narrow and too cumbersome in practice such that it is an inadequate 
formality, excluding scenarios where people would want informed consent and 
only requiring minimal disclosures that do not allow for a full understanding of 
the privacy the risks.55 
 
 50. Id. 
 51. Common Rule 2019, STAN. RES. COMPLIANCE OFF., https://researchcompliance.stanford.edu/ 
panels/hs/common-rule#hs (last visited Mar. 19, 2019) [hereinafter Common Rule 2019]. 
 52. 45 C.F.R § 46.102(e)(1) (2018) (emphasis added). 
 53. Id. § 46.102(e)(5)–(6). 
 54. See Common Rule 2019, supra note 51. 
 55. See generally Robert F. Weir & Jay R. Horton, DNA Banking and Informed Consent: Part 1, IRB: 
ETHICS & HUM. RES., July–Aug. 1995, at 1, 1–4 (1995) (examining what “the reasonable participant” expected 
to learn prior to participation where the genetic research projects involved DNA banking and storage); Informed 
Consent for Genetics Research, NIH NAT’L HUM. GENOME RES. INST., https://www.genome.gov/27026588/ 
informed-consent-for-genomics-research (last updated Jan. 8, 2018) (noting that the NIH was the first to 
recognize a heightened standard for informed consent for genetics research despite the rejection of proposed 
changes in the NPRM and providing guidance for its own funded studies). 
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3.  Revised Common Rule 
For almost three decades, the Common Rule was left untouched while the 
technology surrounding genome research advanced dramatically.56 Traditionally 
common scientific practices, such as using leftover samples from medical 
procedures for research and data for secondary research, are starting to cause 
concern given the ability to match an anonymous sample with the original donor 
through DNA analysis and further derive meaning from the DNA.57 In 2011, 
proposals to revise the Common Rule aimed to address new issues such as 
informed consent for biological samples and the increased vulnerability of health 
information inherent in decoding and analyzing uniquely individual DNA.58 The 
revisions proposed in the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) in 2015 
might have answered many of these newly emerging questions, but the most 
progressive revisions were not adopted.59  
On January 19, 2017, the Office for Human Research Protections (OHRP) 
and the HHS published the revised Common Rule (or Final Rule) which 
purportedly aims to “modernize, strengthen, and make more effective” the 
regulations and is “intended to better protect human subjects involved in 
research, while facilitating valuable research and reducing burden, delay, and 
ambiguity for investigators.”60 The effective date, originally January 19, 2018, 
has been delayed twice for periods of six months each—finally settled at January 
21, 2019.61  
Among the NPRM’s exciting proposed revisions affecting the field of 
genomics were: (1) several alternative proposals for expanding the definition of 
“human subject” to cover research with all biospecimens regardless of 
identifiability, or if the intent was “to generate the genome or exome sequence” 
or “information unique to an individual;”62 (2) expanding the definition of 
“identifiable private information” at the least to match the term “personally 
 
 56. Holly Fernandez Lynch, A New Day for Oversight of Human Subjects Research, HEALTH AFF.: 
HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Feb. 6, 2017), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2017/02/06/a-new-day-for-oversight-of-
human-subjects-research. 
 57. See John Bohannon, Genealogy Databases Enable Naming of Anonymous DNA Donors, 339 SCIENCE 
262, 262 (2013); Gymrek et al., supra note 10, at 321–24. 
 58. Lynch, supra note 56. 
 59. Id.; see also Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, 82 Fed. Reg. 7149, 7150 (Jan. 19, 
2017) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 46 (2018)) (summarizing proposals set forth in the NPRM that were not 
ultimately adopted in the final rule). 
 60. Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, 82 Fed. Reg. at 7149, 7232. 
 61. Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects: Delay of the Revisions to the Federal Policy for 
the Protection of Human Subjects, 83 Fed. Reg. 2885 (Jan. 22, 2018); Federal Policy for the Protection of Human 
Subjects: Six Month Delay of the General Compliance Date of Revisions While Allowing the Use of Three 
Burden-Reducing Provisions During the Delay Period, 83 Fed. Reg. 28,497 (June 19, 2018). The second delay 
provides that institutions may elect to begin certain “burden-reducing” and institution-friendly provisions, while 
the few subject-friendly provisions that made it into the Final Rule are subject to the delay. See id. 
 62. Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, 82 Fed. Reg. at 7163–64, 7200–01 (Section III. 
Definitions for Purposes of this Policy and Section VI. Protection of Identifiable Private Information and 
Identifiable Biospecimens respectively). 
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identifiable information” used in some federal privacy statutes;63 and (3) the 
addition of a new “basic element of [informed consent]” that requires a statement 
describing whether or not identifiers will be removed from information or 
biospecimens and used in future research without additional consent.64 
However, these proposals, which would have significantly increased the 
protection of genomic data used in research, were not adopted in the Final 
Rule.65  
“[T]he proposal set off alarm bells [in the scientific community] because it 
would have imposed new rules for research using blood, urine, tissue, and other 
specimens leftover from clinical care or a specific research study.”66 Proponents 
of the expanded definition of “human subject” could not agree which alternative 
proposals were the best in terms of (1) planning for future technology, (2) 
balancing the Belmont Report’s ethical principles of autonomy, beneficence, 
and justice, and (3) giving rights in the “bio-unique information” back to the 
subject.67 Opponents of the changes argued that expanding the definitions of 
both “human subject” and “identifiable private information” would create huge 
costs and administrative burdens because they would require tracking informed 
consent for an exponentially growing number of participants, or alternatively, 
scaring away potential participants by asking for consent that is too broad.68 
They also argued that changes would create new privacy concerns because the 
samples would need to be linked to an informed consent tracking system, which 
would prevent the samples from ever truly being de-identified.69 This argument 
is circular because the proposed new definition of “human subject” would have 
acknowledged that biospecimens are inherently unique and that removing 
donors’ names will never be enough—that de-identification is not possible. 
The biospecimen proposals were a reaction to infamous cases, such as 
those of Henrietta Lacks and the Havasupai Indians, which both involved the 
unauthorized but legal use of leftover samples.70 Henrietta Lacks was an African 
American woman who was treated for cervical cancer at Johns Hopkins Medical 
Center.71 A sample of cancerous tissue, taken during a biopsy and used for 
subsequent research without consent, proved to be infinitely valuable to 
scientific research because of her cells’ rare ability to multiply infinitely.72 This 
immortal cell line (named HeLa) played an important role in “research into the 
 
 63. Id.  
 64. Id. at 7214–15 (Section XIV. General Provisions for Informed Consent). 
 65. See id. at 7150 (summarizing proposals not adopted). 
 66. Kaiser, supra note 21. 
 67. Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, 82 Fed. Reg. at 7165–68. 
 68. Id. at 7168, 7202; Kaiser, supra note 21. 
 69. Kaiser, supra note 21. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Henrietta Lacks, LACKS FAMILY, http://www.lacksfamily.net/henrietta.php (last visited Mar. 19, 
2019). See generally REBECCA SKLOOT, THE IMMORTAL LIFE OF HENRIETTA LACKS (2010) (telling the story of 
Henrietta Lacks through interviews with her family, scientists, and others affected by the HeLa cell line). 
 72. SKLOOT, supra note 71, at 4. 
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genes that cause cancer and those that suppress it; [and] helped develop drugs 
for treating herpes, leukemia, influenza, hemophilia, and Parkinson’s disease” 
and have been influential in countless other studies.73 In 2013, the HeLa cell's 
DNA sequence was published in a public database as part of the mandatory 
disclosure of data accompanying publication of a study.74 This publication 
breached the privacy interests of the entire Lacks family due to genetic 
similarities within families.75 
The Havasupai, an Arizona Native American tribe, gave specific consent 
when donating blood samples for research on the prevalence of diabetes within 
their tribe.76 In 2010, the Havasupai “issued a ‘banishment order’ to keep 
Arizona State University employees from setting foot on their reservation”77 
when they learned that University researchers had used the tribe’s blood samples 
for research beyond diabetes research,78 including DNA research that revealed 
the geographical origins of the tribe subsequently devastating the tribe’s Grand 
Canyon origin story.79  
Harkening back to the Final Rule, there is one adopted provision that 
promises reform is coming, even if the scientific community is not receptive just 
yet:  
The Final Rule requires the Common Rule departments and agencies to re-
examine the definition of the terms “identifiable private information” and 
“identifiable biospecimen.” It also requires them to assess whether there are 
“analytic technologies and techniques that should be considered by investigators 
to generate identifiable private information or identifiable biospecimens.”80 
These reviews will occur at least once every four years, beginning one year from 
the effective date.81 The resulting recommendations on consent, privacy, and 
data protections will then go through a public comment process.82 “The 
preamble to the rule specifically notes that whole genome sequencing is 
expected to be one of the first technologies to be evaluated to determine if it 
should be on this list.”83  
B.  PROBLEMS POSED BY ADVANCES IN BIOTECHNOLOGY 
For decades, there has been a “robust anonymization assumption”—a 
supposition that if a sample is stripped of all personally identifying information, 
 
 73. Id. 
 74. John Arst, Sharing the Whole HeLa Genome, ASBMB TODAY, Feb. 2017, at 12, 13. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Amy Harmon, Indian Tribe Wins Fight to Limit Research of Its DNA, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 21, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/22/us/22dna.html?pagewanted=all. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Highlights of Revisions to the Common Rule, NIH NAT’L HUM. GENOME RES. INST. (Mar. 7, 2017), 
https://www.genome.gov/27568212/highlights-of-revisions-to-the-common-rule. 
 81. Id.  
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
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such as names, dates, and locations, then it is not possible to link that sample 
back to the subject.84 Thus, anonymization and de-identification were 
considered the best ways for researchers to make efficient and ongoing use of 
collected samples without compromising a subject’s right to privacy.85 
However, de-identification can no longer ensure the protection of a participant’s 
privacy by disassociating the person’s identity from the study. Scientists, with 
the help of rapidly advancing biotechnology, can now decode DNA, making a 
person’s unique DNA highly identifiable86 and the sensitive information coded 
therein accessible to others. Genome sequencing preserves the connection 
between the participant and future research, so the practical definition of “direct” 
human contact needs to be expanded accordingly. The inability to truly 
disassociate the participant from the research poses a significant problem to 
privacy. 
The concepts of privacy, consent, and autonomy are delicately intertwined. 
When giving informed consent, one gives permission for participation in 
research by weighing the benefits against the risks and consenting to the possible 
risks. Stronger privacy protections would decrease the risk of privacy breaches 
or the potential consequences of such breaches for the individual, such as genetic 
discrimination or stigma for carrying certain traits. Weaker privacy protections 
necessarily require the individual to consent to a greater risk of genetic 
information misuse. If people had control over their own information and could 
exercise their own autonomous choices about the uses of their bio-unique 
information, informed consent could be strong.  
Currently, human subjects erroneously believe they are fully informed as 
to what will be done with their protected health information and genetic 
materials (and researchers think they are obtaining informed consent). However, 
many study participants cannot imagine, and are not actually provided with, a 
realistic idea of the sort of privacy risks, especially future risks, to which they 
are consenting. Therefore, the consent is not informed and is invalid. 
Furthermore, while confidentiality of information might feel like the best 
solution from the perspective of the participant, it also slows scientific progress. 
Thus, it is important to strike a compromise between the interests of the 
individual and the interests of society.  
The practice of de-identification can also negatively impact volunteer 
research subjects.87 De-identification limits research participants’ ability to 
control their data, including making withdrawal from a research study nearly 
impossible.88 It can also prevent researchers from being able to return individual 
 
 84. Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of Anonymization, 57 
UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1706–07 (2010). 
 85. Id. at 1703–04. 
 86. See, e.g., Gymrek et al., supra note 10 (conducting a study specifically to see if it is possible to 
reidentify de-identified samples from anonymous research participants and concluding that it is possible). 
 87. Dove, supra note 11, at 680–81. 
 88. Id. 
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results to participants.89 Additionally, the more information about individuals 
available publicly or through other studies, the less effective “de-identifying” 
becomes because information previously stripped from the data to protect the 
individual’s identity can be re-matched; thus the participant can be re-
identified.90 
1. Re-Identification from Genomic Data 
While data sharing has opened up a whole new realm of research, it has 
also created a whole new realm of privacy concerns. Recently, researchers have 
proven the scientific community’s worst fear: that the widespread public 
availability of personally identifying data paired with the technology to analyze 
DNA makes re-identification possible.91  
In 2013, Melissa Gymrek and fellow researchers questioned whether 
anonymous participants from a previous study were really anonymous.92 The 
study shows that “surnames can be recovered from personal genomes by 
profiling short tandem repeats on the Y chromosome (Y-STRs) and querying 
recreational genetic genealogy databases.”93 Using only a free public genealogy 
search engine and thirty-four identifiers on a Y chromosome as a test, the study 
“project[ed] a success rate of ~12% . . . in recovering surnames of U.S. 
Caucasian males” using just one search engine.94 The other eighty-three percent 
were unknown because there were no matches in that particular search engine.95 
After uncovering the surname, the researchers were able to add demographic 
data to “narrow down the identity of the sample originator to just a few 
individuals.”96 The more identifiers that were added (such as age) the smaller 
the list of potential matches, many of which were within the same family.97 
While the study originally identified only male donors via matches of the Y 
chromosome, the information learned about family lines enabled the researchers 
to identify female donors too.98 
Gymrek’s study was not the first to raise alarms about the possibility of re-
identifying DNA. For example, an older study used single nucleotide 
polymorphisms (SNPs), another unique identifier on DNA, to identify 
individuals from “seemingly anonymous pools of DNA data.”99 Additionally, 
“[i]n a number of public cases, male adoptees and descendants of anonymous 
 
 89. Id. Some research participants may want to be notified if a gene is discovered in their DNA which 
predisposes them to a disabling illness. Conversely, others may want to live without this knowledge.  
 90. Id. 
 91. See generally Gymrek et al., supra note 10. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 321. 
 94. Id. at 322. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Bohannon, supra note 57, at 262. 
 99. Id.  
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sperm donors used recreational genetic genealogy services to genotype their Y-
chromosome haplotypes and to search the companies’ databases” to determine 
the identity of their biological fathers.100 If individuals are uniquely identifiable 
from matching patterns in only partially decoded DNA, then the danger is 
greater now that technology enables full DNA sequencing.  
In response to Gymrek’s study, the National Institutes of Health (NIH), 
which hosts public genome databases for use by researchers, decided to remove 
identifying information from some databases and restricted access to others.101 
Although there have been no reported cases of malicious DNA re-identifying to 
date, the future safety of DNA anonymity is uncertain.102 There is a danger that 
it will become profitable to decode DNA or re-identify data for marketing, 
commercial, crime solving, or other purposes. While this process may require 
special knowledge and skill, re-identification likely will become easier with time 
as the wealth of publicly available data increases and technology improves.103 
2.  Scientific Research Practices Regarding Tissue Samples and Data 
Scientific and technological advancements have facilitated the emergence 
of a whole new type of scientific research that promises to treat and cure many 
diseases that plague humankind. Genetic research provides information about 
humans in general, and information unique to individuals in particular. Modern 
pursuits in genetics could revolutionize medicine by allowing scientists to 
identify genes that predispose a person to a particular disease and tailor 
treatments to each individual person with Precision Medicine.104 
Genome-wide association studies, and other large-scale studies, require 
amassing substantial amounts of genetic and health-related data so that patterns 
in the genomes of individuals can be identified.105 Biobanks provide a great 
resource for scientists to access the enormous amounts of bio-specimens and 
data required for “large-scale genomic analysis,” termed “big biology,” a tip of 
 
 100. Gymrek et al., supra note 10, at 321. 
 101. Id. 
 102. One re-identification study targeted a particular individual. In 2010, MITgraduate student Latanya 
Sweeney was able to re-identify” Massachusetts Governor William Weld using knowledge that Weld had 
collapsed on stage while receiving an honorary doctorate from the Bentley College, a voter list, and “a dataset 
released by the Massachusetts Group Insurance Commission to improve healthcare and control[] costs.” Mark 
Van Rijmenam, The Re-Identification of Anonymous People with Big Data, DATAFLOQ, 
https://datafloq.com/read/re-identifying-anonymous-people-with-big-data/228 (last visited Mar. 19, 2019). 
 103. Interestingly enough, maybe privacy has lagged so far behind scientific advancement that now we can 
use science and technology to address privacy concerns. In 2017, a study demonstrated that genomic diagnoses 
could be made while keeping more than ninety-nine percent of the most sensitive genetic information private. 
See Karthik A. Jagadeesh et al., Deriving Genomic Diagnoses Without Revealing Patient Genomes, 357 SCIENCE 
692 (2017). This approach to achieving data privacy would require tremendous trust in the scientific community.  
 104. See What Is Precision Medicine?, NIH NAT’L LIBR. MED. (Feb. 19, 2019), https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/ 
primer/precisionmedicine/definition.  
 105. Genome-Wide Association Studies, NIH NAT’L HUM. GENOME RES. INST., https://www.genome.gov/ 
20019523/genomewide-association-studies-fact-sheet/ (last updated Aug. 27, 2015). 
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the hat to the big data era.106 Biobanks are “designed and operated to collect, 
store, analyze, curate, and distribute biological specimens and data for future, 
as-yet unspecified research as approved by an ethics committee or a comparable 
body.”107  
Sharing data and results among researchers is essential to the efficacy of 
this new age of research, but it also poses a two-fold problem. First, privacy and 
informed consent regulations apply differently to different types of 
organizations (that is, private or public, government-funded, foreign entities)108 
and to different types of samples, which creates a maze of often confusing 
regulations and guidelines, undesirable gaps in protection, and a lack of redress 
in cases of privacy breaches.109 Second, when a participant gives consent for his 
specimen or data to be stored in a biobank for use in research, he must agree 
broadly to unspecified future research.110 Broad consent is worrisome because 
the participant loses control over and knowledge about who has access to his 
information and future research uses.  
Some of the misunderstandings between the researcher and the participant 
regarding privacy expectations might stem from the underlying traditional 
physician-patient relationship and the implied duty of confidentiality. “The 
finding that the confidentiality of genetic data cannot be guaranteed suggests 
that a research participant’s consent might not be valid when it is conditioned on 
the assurance or even the unchallenged expectation of full genetic secrecy.”111 
“[C]ommon and widely used consent practices might in fact result in 
disingenuous consent, at least insofar as they are based on untenable promises 
of privacy and confidentiality.”112  
The problem of re-identification and the potential for DNA to be a unique 
identifier of individuals is neither a secret nor lost on the scientific community.  
[A]nything approaching a comprehensive genotype or phenotype (including 
molecular phenotypes) ultimately reveals subjects’ identities . . . such as a name 
and social security number would. The American Society of Human Genetics 
(ASHG) declares the following in a statement on genome-wide association 
studies: “[the ASHG is] acutely aware that the most accurate individual identifier 
is the DNA sequence itself or its surrogate here, genotypes across the genome.”113  
 
 106. Mark A. Rothstein et al., Comparative Approaches to Biobanks and Privacy, 44 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 
161, 161 (2016). 
 107. Id. 
 108. The examination of how the differences of privacy law between countries affect international transfers 
of data is beyond the scope of this Note. Nonetheless, it is a relevant and important consideration in developing 
a reformed national system that is compatible with and facilitates cooperation with foreign scientists. See 
generally Dove, supra note 11 (discussing the harmonization of international privacy frameworks in the context 
of facilitating data sharing between international biobanks). 
 109. Id. at 682; Rothstein et al., supra note 106, at 169. 
 110. Rothstein et al., supra note 106, at 163–64. 
 111. Lunshof et al., supra note 19, at 408. 
 112. Id. at 409. 
 113. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting AM. SOC’Y OF HUMAN GENETICS, POLICY STATEMENT: ASHG 
RESPONSE TO NIH ON GENOME-WIDE ASSOCIATION STUDIES (2006), http://www.ashg.org/pdf/policy/ 
ASHG_PS_November2006.pdf). 
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However, attempts to directly address the issue have been hindered by a 
reluctance to admit the extent of the problem, hesitancy to impede scientific 
progress, and disagreement about the best next course of action as we saw in the 
Common Rule revision process.114 
II.  A COMPARISON OF PRIVACY REGULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES AND 
THE EUROPEAN UNION 
There are several glaring differences between the treatment of privacy 
regulations in the United States compared to the European Union. First, the EU 
has an omnibus privacy statute that governs all matters related to information 
privacy, whereas the United States uses many laws covering particular 
information sectors.115 Second, the United States has no default prohibition on 
data processing, meaning it is legal to collect, process, use, and sell personal data 
from almost any source.116 There are limitations only where expressly called out 
by statute. In contrast, the EU prohibits data processing by default in the absence 
of the data subject’s consent, unless a company can provide a specific legal 
justification for the processing.117  
A third key difference is that the United States has no general data 
minimization concept.118 The EU limits processing of personal data “to what is 
necessary in relation to the purposes for which [it is] processed.”119 In 
comparison to the United States, companies can collect as much data as they 
want and retain it as long as they want, “so long as they comply with applicable 
consent, notice and security requirements.”120 Finally, there are no restrictions 
on international transfers of data.121  
A.  FEDERAL PRIVACY REGULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 
The United States does not have an overarching privacy law.122 In fact, the 
federal regulations in this area are so piecemeal that nearly every state has 
enacted its own regulations to provide additional privacy protections for 
 
 114. See generally Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, 82 Fed. Reg. 7149, 7150 (Jan. 19, 
2017) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 46 (2018)) (summarizing public comments on the Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking). 
 115. DETERMANN, supra note 22, § 1-5:4. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the 
Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of 
Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), art. 5(1)(c), 2016 O.J. (L 
119) 1 [hereinafter GDPR]. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
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personal data, health information, and genetic information.123 The federal sector-
specific privacy laws (such as separate online privacy, data breach notification, 
health information privacy, and consumer protection laws) developed largely 
reactively to solve then-current privacy issues, rather than as preventative or 
advisory measures.124 This may be a function of the U.S. judicial system, which 
resolves individual “cases and controversies,” specific problems with particular 
facts.125 
1.  The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
The HHS issued the Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable 
Health Information, (the Privacy Rule) as a part of the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA).126 The Privacy Rule set forth 
regulations for the management of electronic health care information and 
incorporated new standards for the privacy and security of individually 
identifiable health information, also known as “protected health information” 
(PHI).127 In 2013, the Omnibus Final Rule amended the Privacy Rule 
specifically to bring genetic information within the definition of PHI.128 The 
Privacy Rule provides protections against (1) discrimination based on a patient’s 
health information by “covered entities,” and (2) disclosures of patients’ private 
 
 123. R. HAKIMIAN ET AL., NAT’L CANCER INST., 50-STATE SURVEY OF LAWS REGULATING THE 
COLLECTION, STORAGE, AND USE OF HUMAN TISSUE SPECIMENS AND ASSOCIATED DATA FOR RESEARCH 3–8 
(2004). See generally Scott Smith et al., Genetic Privacy Laws: 50 State Survey, 5 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 75 
(2011). While state laws are beyond the scope of this Note, it is interesting to note that the most protective of 
the state genetic privacy statutes (until the California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018) is actively being 
challenged.  
The Alaska Genetic Privacy Act S18.13.010-100, is [the most] comprehensive [state] genetic privacy 
law. It strictly limits genetic testing as well as access to, retention and disclosure of genetic data 
without the “informed and written consent” of the individual. The law also recognizes that both the 
genetic information and the DNA samples collected are the property of the individual . . . . 
State Genetic Privacy Policy, ELECTION PRIVACY INFO. CTR., https://epic.org/state-policy/genetic-privacy (last 
visited Mar. 19, 2019). Plaintiff, commercial genetic testing company Gene by Gene, Ltd., “assert[s] that the 
statute is unconstitutionally vague in its definitions of ‘DNA analysis’ and ‘genetic characteristics’ and in its 
failure to define ‘disclose’ and ‘informed and written consent.’” Jennifer K. Wagner, A Constitutional Challenge 
to Alaska’s Genetic Privacy Statute, PRIVACY REP. (July 18, 2017), https://theprivacyreport.com/2017/07/18/a-
constitutional-challenge-to-alaskas-genetic-privacy-statute/. However, as of August 21, 2018, the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of the class certification. Cole v. Gene by Gene, Ltd., 735 F. App’x 368 
(9th Cir. 2018) (mem.), aff’g 322 F.R.D. 500 (D. Alaska 2017). 
 124. DETERMANN, supra note 22, § 1-5:4 (“The U.S. Congress decided against European-style omnibus data 
protection legislation in the 1970s. California has taken a similar approach and only enacted privacy legislation 
regarding specific threats, industries and groups of data subjects.” (footnote omitted)). 
 125. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
 126. PROTECTING HUMAN RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS, supra note 35, at 9. 
 127. HIPAA for Professionals, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (June 16, 2017), 
https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/index.html. 
 128. FOLEY & LARDNER LLP, PRIVACY ISSUES IN THE SHARING OF GENETIC INFORMATION (2014), 
https://www.foley.com/files/Publication/7465587b-5df9-4f85-996968ce1b4c39af/Presentation/Publication 
Attachment/88ba6035-c031-4ff4-b4e2-6ad15030b17d/PrivacyIssuesintheSharingofGeneticInformation.pdf. 
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health information without consent; however, it is by no means all-
encompassing.129  
The Privacy Rule only applies to certain “covered entities,” including 
health plans and health care providers, to limit disclosure of information, and it 
only applies to some receiving entities, such as health insurance companies, to 
prohibit their unauthorized use of the information.130 Importantly, the Privacy 
Rule does not apply if the information is “de-identified,” “anonymous,” or in the 
public domain.131 Consequently, hospitals and research institutions can disclose 
health information freely so long as it is stripped of certain identifiers. And 
insurance companies can use customers’ information to discriminate if they get 
the information from the public domain. Discrimination based on health 
information is a problem because a lot of de-identified data is now available in 
the public domain in data repositories.132 It only takes someone with the motive, 
skill, and financial resources to re-identify the data and an improper motive to 
exploit that information.  
The Privacy Rule protects PHI defined as individually identifiable health 
information 
that relates to: the individual’s past, present or future physical or mental health 
or condition, the provision of health care to the individual, or the past, present, or 
future payment for the provision of health care to the individual, and that 
identifies the individual or for which there is a reasonable basis to believe it can 
be used to identify the individual.133  
Until recently, there have been almost no restrictions on the use or disclosure of 
de-identified health information134 because the traditionally accepted view is 
that “[d]e-identified health information neither identifies nor provides a 
reasonable basis to identify an individual.”135 However, as Gymrek’s study 
demonstrates, this is no longer true. 
2.  The Genetic Information Non-Discrimination Act  
The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 (GINA) was 
passed on May 21, 2008, in order to provide a federal regulation to supplement 
individual state privacy regulations and the protections provided under 
HIPAA.136 “GINA was designed to protect individuals from discrimination on 
 
129. Summary of the HIPAA Privacy Rule, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (July 26, 2013), 
https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/privacy/laws-regulations/index.html. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Pike, supra note 8, at 1981. Many journals require researchers to submit their data, including genetic 
sequences, to public databases as a prerequisite to publishing an article in the journal. Id. Internet technology 
has made access to these databases readily available. 
 133. Summary of the HIPPA Privacy Rule, supra note 129 (emphasis added). 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Amy L. McGuire & Mary Anderlik Majumder, Two Cheers for GINA?, 1 GENOME MED. 6.1, 6.1 
(2009). 
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the basis of genetic information with respect to health insurance and 
employment,” particularly including information about genetic tests as they 
relate to individuals, families, and family history.137 “Supporters of 
GINA . . . hope that it will alleviate the public’s concerns about genetic 
discrimination, which many believe have discouraged the utilization of 
medically necessary genetic services and participation in important genetic 
research.”138 “Critics worry that GINA does not provide adequate protection 
because it fails to address discrimination on the basis of non-genetic health-
related information, and it only regulates the use of genetic information in health 
insurance and employment.”139 For example, GINA does not protect against 
discrimination for mental health consultations or actual manifestation of a 
disorder and would not prevent discrimination by other types of insurance 
companies.140 
B. PRIVACY REGULATIONS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
 The EU has expanded the traditional scope of privacy rights, recognizing 
“an explicit fundamental ‘right to the protection of personal data.’”141 Under the 
law in the EU, “personal data can be collected only under strict conditions and 
for a legitimate purpose.”142 The highly anticipated GDPR 2016/679 became 
effective as of May 25, 2018, yet holds true to the key principles of the 
progressive Data Protection Directive 1995/46/EC (Directive).143 The GDPR 
provides more regulatory power for greater consistency between the EU member 
states.144  
1.  The Data Protection Directive 
The Directive incorporated health data and technological use data into the 
same protective regulations, creating a holistic approach to privacy and defining 
personal data as any information that relates to an identified or identifiable 
 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id.  
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. at 6.2.  
 141. Dove, supra note 11, at 679 (quoting Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 8(1), 
2010 O.J. (C 83) 389, 393 [hereinafter Charter of Rights]). 
 142. Daniel Dimov, Differences Between the Privacy Laws in the EU and the U.S., INFOSEC INST. (Jan. 10, 
2013), http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/differences-privacy-laws-in-eu-and-us/#gref. 
 143. GDPR Key Changes, EU GDPR.ORG, https://eugdpr.org/the-regulation/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2019). 
 144. The Directive was progressive for 1995, however, “as per European Union Law, Directives allow each 
member state some discretion as to how to achieve the result of data protection in a way that accords with 
national legal traditions.” Dove, supra note 11, at 683. A Regulation, on the other hand, “is transposed and 
directly applicable across the European Union” binding as law upon each state. Id. “The direct applicability of 
a Regulation . . . will reduce legal fragmentation and provide greater legal certainty by introducing a harmonized 
set of core rules, improving the protection of fundamental rights of individuals.” Commission Proposal for a 
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the 
Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data (General Data Protection Regulation), at 
5–6, COM (2012) 11 final (Jan. 25, 2012). 
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natural person “who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by 
reference to an identification number or to one or more factors specific to his 
physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social identity.”145 The 
Directive outlined seven fundamental privacy principles for the governance of 
personal data: necessity, finality, transparency, legitimacy, proportionality, data 
accuracy, and security carried over to the GDPR.146 “These principles define the 
rights of individual data subjects and the responsibilities of data controllers in 
the context of processing personal data, regardless of the context.”147 
A key difference between U.S. and EU privacy regulations is that the 
language in the EU Directive specifies that even information that could be 
identifiable falls within its protections. For example, an x-ray of a person’s foot, 
even if not labeled with information that would allow it to be easily matched to 
a person, like name, date of birth, or zip code, is identifiable information because 
if you went around x-raying feet, eventually you would find a match, making 
that piece of information identifiable. Genetic information, because it is specific 
to a unique individual, regardless of the ease with which it could be matched 
back to a particular person, is identifiable personal information. The Article 29 
Data Protection Working Party (Working Party) issued an opinion confirming 
that genetic data is, by definition, personal data and further opined that “genetic 
data is entitled to heightened protection as “particularly sensitive data” under the 
Directive.148 “[S]ensitive data . . . may only be processed in exceptional 
circumstances.”149  
2.  General Data Protection Regulation  
The GDPR “is a dramatic shift to data transparency and empowerment of 
data subjects.”150 It revised and strengthened the requirements for consent; 
“companies are no longer able to use long illegible terms and conditions full of 
legalese. The request for consent must be given in an intelligible and easily 
accessible form, with the purpose for data processing attached to that 
consent.”151 It expands the right to access, giving data subjects the right to know 
 
 145. Directive 95/46/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the 
Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such 
Data, art. 2(a), 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 38. 
 146. Nancy J. King et al., Workplace Privacy and Discrimination Issues Related to Genetic Data: A 
Comparative Law Study of the European Union and the United States, 43 AM. BUS. L.J. 79, 162 (2006). 
 147. Id. at 147. 
 148. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Working Document on Genetic Data, 12178/03/EN, WP 91, 
at 5 (Mar. 17, 2004) (emphasis omitted) [hereinafter Working Document on Genetic Data]. The Data Protection 
Working Party, established by Article 29 of the Directive, “provides the European Commission with independent 
advice on data protection matters and helps in the development of harmonised policies for data protection in the 
EU Member States.” Article 29 Working Party, EUR. DATA PROTECTION SUPERVISOR, https://edps.europa.eu/ 
node/3095#articlewp (last visited Mar. 19, 2019). 
 149. Working Document on Genetic Data, supra note 148, at 5–6. 
 150. GDPR Key Changes, supra note 143. 
 151. Id. 
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whether information is being processed about them and the right to receive a 
copy free of charge.152 The right to be forgotten “entitles the data subject to have 
the data controller erase his/her personal data, cease further dissemination of the 
data, and potentially have third parties halt processing of the data,” particularly 
if “the data [is] no longer . . . relevant to original purposes for processing” or the 
data subject wants to withdraw consent.153 However, “this right requires 
controllers to compare the subjects’ rights to ‘the public interest in the 
availability of the data’ when considering such requests.”154 Data portability 
gives data subjects the right to request and transfer to another party the 
information collected about them.155 Privacy by design “calls for the inclusion 
of data protection from the onset of the designing of systems” and finally, data 
minimization “calls for controllers to hold and process only the data absolutely 
necessary for the completion of its duties.”156  
The Working Party explicitly mapped the Directive’s seven fundamental 
privacy principles—necessity, finality, transparency, legitimacy, 
proportionality, data accuracy, and security—onto their application to genetic 
data.157 In doing so, the Working Party stated, 
Considering the complexity and the sensitivity of the genetic information, there 
is a great risk of misuse and/or re-use for various purposes by the data controller 
or third parties. Risks of re-use might occur e.g. using the genetic information 
already extracted, or through additional analysis of the underlying material (e.g. 
blood sample). . . .  
  . . . Genetic data may only be used if adequate, relevant and not excessive.158  
The Working Party recognized that genetic data can be easily obtained 
without the knowledge of the individual, is unique to the individual, is 
particularly personal comparable to health data, and can impact the individual’s 
immediate family, and even a whole group, or ethnic community to which the 
data subject belongs. For these reasons, genetic information is particularly 
sensitive making the groups to which the information pertain particularly 
vulnerable.159 The opinion warns that “mankind should not be reduced to its 
genetic characteristics only, to its sole genetic cartography, which . . . does not 
constitute the ultimate universal explanation of human life.”160 
 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Working Document on Genetic Data, supra note 148, at 2. 
 158. Id. at 6. 
 159. Id. at 4; see also Donna M. Gitter, Informed Consent and Privacy of Non-Identified Bio-Specimens and 
Estimated Data: Lessons from Iceland and the United States in an Era of Computational Genomics, 38 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 1251, 1261 (2017) (discussing how population-wide database studies such as those in Iceland and Utah 
allow researchers to develop “estimated data” about non-consenting families and communities of those 
individuals who did consent to participate in the research). 
 160. Working Document on Genetic Data, supra note 148, at 4. 
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Compared to the privacy protections in the United States offered by 
HIPAA and GINA, the EU’s GDPR is more comprehensive with a broader 
definition of protected identifiable information, and specifically calls out genetic 
information as included within this definition. Although HIPAA and GINA do 
provide protection for genetic information, their regulations apply narrowly and 
fail to make the jump classifying genetic information as inherently identifiable. 
Additionally, the EU’s privacy framework contemplates all types of data created 
by an individual and specifically works to provide better information and more 
choice to the individual as an integrated policy, whereas the United States’ 
privacy regulations and informed consent regulations are very much fragmented 
and do not seem to contemplate how the two ideas so harmoniously complement 
each other. 
III.  FROM HUMAN DIGNITY TO AUTONOMY 
The United States emphasizes independence, privacy, and an individual’s 
right to make life decisions in its liberal concept of autonomy, which, perhaps 
inadvertently, has fostered distrust of the scientific institution. On the other hand, 
the EU’s more communitarian conception is based on an individual’s 
fundamental right to human dignity, which embodies an underlying trust in 
people to be inherently good. Compared to the EU’s “highly comprehensive” 
fundamental data privacy right,161 the United States’ privacy patchwork seems 
lacking.162 The EU considers the privacy regulations in the United States to be 
presumptively inadequate, as evidenced in the EU’s enactment and overruling 
of the U.S.-EU Safe Harbor for commercial transfers of information,163 and then 
the enactment and threatened suspension of the Privacy Shield replacement.164 
 
 161. Justin Kent Holcombe, Solutions for Regulating Offshore Outsourcing in the Service Sector: Using the 
Law, Market, International Mechanisms, and Collective Organization as Building Blocks, 7 U. PA. J. LAB. & 
EMP. L. 539, 552 (2005). 
 162. Dimov, supra note 142 (“Under EU law, personal data can be collected only under strict conditions 
and for a legitimate purpose. . . . The different approaches of the EU and US towards data protection probably 
stem from history. In Europe, where people have had dictatorships, data protection is declared as a human right 
and regulated by comprehensive data protection legislation. . . . In contrast, in the US, the attitude towards data 
protection is governed mainly by market forces.”). 
 163. Rothstein et al., supra note 106, at 167–68; see also Case C-362/14, Schrems v. Data Prot. Comm’r, 
2015 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 657 (Sept. 23, 2015) (holding the US-EU Safe-Harbor invalid because an 
adequate level of protection must be understood to be “essentially equivalent” to that within the European 
Union). 
 164. See European Parliament Resolution of 5 July 2018 on the Adequacy of the Protection Afforded by the 
EU-US Privacy Shield, 2018 RSP 2645 (2018) (“[The Parliament] [c]onsiders that, unless the U.S. is fully 
compliant by 1 September 2018, the Commission has failed to act in accordance with Article 45(5) GDPR; calls 
therefore on the Commission to suspend the Privacy Shield until the U.S. authorities comply with its terms.”). 
After the United States missed the compliance deadline, the Commission granted the United States until 
February 28, 2019 to at least appoint a permanent Privacy Shield ombudsman or it would take “appropriate 
measures.” Rebecca Hill, Looks Like Uncle Sam Has Pulled its Finger out and Appointed a Privacy Shield 
Ombusdsperson, REGISTER (Jan. 22, 2019, 4:30 PM), https://www.theregister.co.uk/2019/01/22/privacy_ 
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A critical comparison of privacy laws between the two governmental systems 
suggests that the EU’s human dignity formulation of autonomy is more 
compatible with technological trends and might ultimately provide a truer 
exercise of autonomy. Re-examining the American view of autonomy may 
better situate the United States to receive a privacy solution that would promote 
scientific advancement while respecting its individual citizens.  
A.  FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO HUMAN DIGNITY 
“Protecting Human dignity is the central tenet of the international human 
rights framework.”165 The de-humanizing atrocities of ruthless experimentation 
on human subjects that took place during World War II acted as the impetus for 
human subjects’ rights in research in Europe and, arguably, the rest of the world, 
as it did in the United States. The United Nations Charter “enshrines the notion 
of human dignity, [and was] followed in 1948 by the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR).”166 The United Nation’s Charter begins: “We the 
Peoples of the United Nations Determined . . . to reaffirm faith in fundamental 
human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person.”167 The Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union (“the Charter”) “brings together in 
a single document the fundamental rights protected in the EU . . . [in a] modern 
codification [that] includes ‘third generation’ fundamental rights, such as: data 
protection; guarantees on bioethics; and transparent administration.”168  
“Human dignity means ‘being accorded the respect and status appropriate 
to a human being, being treated in a way that allows or enables one to live a 
becoming existence.’”169 This recognition of a fundamental right to human 
dignity170 is the foundation upon which many of the other fundamental rights are 
built upon including, the right to life, the right to the physical and mental 
integrity of the person (including “[i]n the fields of medicine and 
biology . . . [requiring] free and informed consent”), the right to liberty and 
security, respect for private and family life, right to the protection of personal 
protection of data, and the right of access to preventative health care and the 
right to benefit from medical treatment.171  
 
shield_ombudsperson/ (internal quotation marks omitted). At the end of January 2019, President Donald Trump 
finally nominated someone to the position. Id. 
 165. King et al., supra note 146, at 101. 
 166. Id. (footnote omitted). 
 167. U.N. Charter pmbl. 
 168. EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, EUR. COMMISSION, https://ec.europa.eu/info/aid-development-
cooperation-fundamental-rights/your-rights-eu/eu-charter-fundamental-rights_en (last visited Mar. 19, 2019); 
see also Charter of Rights, supra note 141, pmbl. 
 169. King et al., supra note 146, at 97 (quoting William A. Wines & Michael P. Fronmueller, American 
Workers Increase Efforts to Establish a Legal Right to Privacy as Civility Declines in U.S. Society: Some 
Observations on the Effort and Its Social Context, 78 NEB. L. REV. 606 (1999)). 
 170. “Human dignity is inviolable. It must be respected and protected.” Charter of Rights, supra note 141, 
art. 1. 
 171. Id. arts. 1–3, 6–8, 35.  
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The EU’s fundamental rights culminate in “respect for the person,” which 
is, in its essence, different than the Belmont Report’s respect for autonomy, 
beneficence, or non-maleficence. Respect for the person connotes all of these 
principles except, at its primary level, it is theoretically different, not bestowing 
an affirmative right on the individual, but establishing an order for the value of 
a person’s life. Nancy King argues that “individual privacy rights in the United 
States are not based on a concept of fundamental rights. American notions of 
privacy are reflected in the concept of ‘rugged individualism.’ Individual 
autonomy and liberty are revered, as is apparent in the jurisprudence of 
decisional privacy.”172 She conceptualizes the right to privacy in the United 
States as “akin to personal property,” which “may be traded away by the 
individual in exchange for something of commensurate value.”173 But within the 
human dignity framework, the right to privacy is not so much a property right, 
but rather considered to inhere in every individual by virtue of their humanity.174 
“[H]uman dignity is not generated by the individual, but is instead created by 
one’s community and bestowed upon the individual.”175  
B.  LIBERAL INDIVIDUALISM VERSUS COMMUNITARIAN AUTONOMY 
The concept of autonomy in the EU is not as narrowly tailored as it is in 
the United States. In the United States., autonomy is a liberty right that allows 
people to realize their true individuality by making decisions that affect their 
persons through an entitlement to privacy in making those decisions.176 
However, this decision-making right is just one component that allows a person 
to realize the full potential in his life. Scholars term this version of autonomy 
“liberal individualism” in order to contrast it with a broader conceptualization 
of autonomy that recognizes the well-being of the individual as the essential 
groundwork to realize true autonomy, “communitarian autonomy.”177 Although 
the “communitarian” version of autonomy encapsulates the ideas of community 
well-being, solidarity, and public interest, it should not be thought of as doing-
away with individualistic liberty in favor of a utilitarian common good. It is an 
alternative understanding of the principle of autonomy that fits harmoniously 
with the ethical principles of beneficence and justice.178 
 
 172. King et al., supra note 146, at 96 (footnote omitted) (citing Jay P. Kesan, Cyber-Working or Cyber-
Shrinking?: A First Principles Examination of Electronic Privacy in the Workplace, 54 FLA. L. REV. 289, 306 
(2002)). 
 173. Id. at 96–97 (applying to the context of exchanging the right to privacy for the value of having a job). 
 174. Id. at 101. 
 175. Id. at 97. 
 176. See generally Margit Sutrop, Changing Ethical Frameworks: From Individual Rights to the Common 
Good?, 20 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 533 (2011). 
 177. See, e.g., Theda Rehbock, Limits of Autonomy in Biomedical Ethics? Conceptual Clarifications, 20 
CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 524, 526 (2011). 
 178. Theda Rehbock argues that, “what we need is a more precise, broader, and more differentiated 
understanding of the concept of autonomy and of its relation to other ethical principles.” Id. at 524. Margit Sutrop 
suggests, “[t]his polarization may have occurred because of overly narrow notions of autonomy and the common 
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Rather than viewing autonomy as the most important and overriding ethics 
principle, as tends to be the view in the United States, it is necessary to recognize 
that autonomy cannot be “respected and applied adequately unless . . . the other 
principles are respected and applied as well.”179 Respect for autonomy will not 
be truly realized until the individual is a fully informed partner in research. The 
more participants are “able to identify with, approve of, and support the goals of 
the research . . . . the more it can be expected that participants would be willing, 
at least afterward, to accept and consent, if necessary, to a certain degree of 
deception or risk.”180  
C.  A KANTIAN PERSPECTIVE  
Theda Rehbock addresses the differing conceptions of autonomy from a 
philosophical perspective with roots going back to the writings of Immanuel 
Kant, John Stuart Mill, and Aristotle.181 While she criticizes the Aristotelian 
approach for being too utilitarian and threatening “a relapse into the old 
paternalism,” she argues for reexamination of the Kantian perspective, which 
presupposes a moral autonomy underlying individual liberty.182 “Respect for 
autonomy should not be reduced to ‘respect for autonomous choices’ and, 
thereby, to respect for the mental capacity (‘competence’) to make such choices 
through informed consent procedures. Rather, it has to be understood in a much 
broader sense as respect for the will of the person.”183 Kantian “moral autonomy 
means self-legislation or self-commitment, according to moral norms that are to 
be followed not because of external command or authority but because of one’s 
own rational insight.”184 “The rational will is one’s own will, not an egoistical 
will, but a general will, which is concerned not only with one’s own liberty and 
happiness, but also with the liberty and happiness of others.”185 “Kant’s 
non-individualistic notion of moral autonomy could be a bridge between ancient 
and modern ethics.”186 
To truly be autonomous, the individual is dependent upon others to receive 
information to aid in decision-making.187 Kant specifies that human dignity 
imposes a positive “duty to help and support others to live their life,” rather than 
 
good, which make it difficult to see their close relationship.” Sutrop, supra note 176, at 534. “This notion has 
arguably become overshadowed by narrow interpretations of individual autonomy, which interpret consent not 
only as one of its manifestations, but also as a quasi-synonym for autonomy itself.” Barbara Prainsack & Alena 
Buyx, A Solidarity-Based Approach to the Governance of Research Biobanks, 21 MED. L. REV. 71, 78 (2013). 
 179. Rehbock, supra note 177, at 524. 
 180. Id. at 528. 
 181. Id. at 525–26. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. at 526; see also Onora O’Neill, Some Limits of Informed Consent, 29 J. MED. ETHICS 4 (2003). But 
cf. Tom L. Beauchamp, Informed Consent: Its History, Meaning, and Present Challenges, 20 CAMBRIDGE Q. 
HEALTHCARE ETHICS 515, 519 (2011) (arguing that broad consent is “not an adequately informed consent”). 
 184. Rehbock, supra note 177, at 527. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. at 529. 
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just a negative duty to not interfere with other’s autonomy, which he refers to as 
the “universal duty of human beings.”188 The EU Charter protects “human 
dignity” as a fundamental right. The EU human dignity conceptualization of 
autonomy, as juxtaposed to the liberal individual conceptualization of autonomy 
implied in the U.S. Constitution, provides a basis for understanding why the 
privacy frameworks in each country differ.189 While both fundamental rights 
focus upon “autonomy,” the difference is embedded in differing philosophical 
ideals. 
D.  NORMALIZING TRUST 
Transparency facilitates trust. However, in science, minimal involvement 
of the subject is less burdensome on the scientists and the study, and so is 
common practice. The attitude of “us versus them” (scientists versus subjects) 
instead of all of us partners in discovery for humankind has created a cycle of 
distrust.190 The emphasis on the liberal individualistic autonomy in the United 
States comes from the perceived need of a person to look after his own interests, 
but distrust actually erodes a person’s autonomy. If providing people with 
information about research will make them less likely to participate, deception 
facilitates research and beneficence seemingly justifies this deception as long as 
the results are for the benefit of the common good.  
On the other hand, including participants in the research by treating them 
as partners, may make them feel empowered enabling participants to embrace 
their communitarian autonomy rather than selfish individual needs.191 
Developing and normalizing a public trust in the scientific community will not 
happen immediately. At first there will be shock and more distrust as the current 
practice come to light, but people will eventually come to terms with the reality 
of the advancement of biotechnology and realize that the benefits are enormous. 
Trust requires relinquishing some control over the immediate, but it ultimately 
facilitates more autonomous control over quality of life.  
IV.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
A.  TECHNOLOGY MAKES ALTERNATIVE CONSENT MODELS FEASIBLE 
“Current developments in genomics challenge the established framework 
of biomedical ethics because the empirical facts of the genomic science change 
too fast for the reflections of ethics to keep pace.”192 The move towards 
 
 188. Id. 
 189. Dove, supra note 11, at 680 (“Reliance on specific consent in this biobanking context falls into a fallacy 
of sufficiency: no participant can be sufficiently informed at the initial stage about the range of unknown actors 
and uncertain events to follow . . . .”). 
 190. Rehbock, supra note 177, at 528. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Lunshof et al., supra note 19, at 406.  
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bioinformatics, gathering and studying personal data, and decoding genetic data 
to determine unique characteristics makes individual participants vulnerable to 
re-identification, “puts the validity of the existing consent protocols into 
question.”193 Therefore, alternative consent models have been offered to replace 
the traditional specific informed consent model.194 Because information stored 
in biobanks is meant to be available to countless researchers for unspecified 
research, the scope of which will be ever-changing as science progresses, some 
researchers ask participants to give a general consent to any type of future 
research; this is known as a “blanket consent.”195 While blanket consents provide 
a simple solution from the researcher’s perspective, other types of consent that 
offer more layers of protection for the participant, are now feasible with the 
advancement of technology. 
“Broad consent” similarly asks for “one-time consent for future research,” 
but requires external review by an ethics committee or authority to ensure that 
the research satisfies the stated mission of the future research.196 This is the 
method used (or proposed for use) by most biobanks.197 “Tiered consent” is 
given when “participants are given a menu of different types of research (e.g., 
cancer; heart disease)” and they can select different categories of research for 
which they give consent.198 “Dynamic consent” asks for initial consent and is 
followed up with subsequent opportunities to opt in or out of future specific 
research uses.199 “Open consent” involves agreeing to unrestricted future usage 
where “[d]ata, whether anonymized or not, are posted on the internet and 
available to any-one in the world.”200 Open consent is the least protective of the 
consent models, but acknowledges the researcher’s intent to make the 
participant’s private information public and involves the participant as a fully 
informed research partner. 
The open consent model was implemented in the Personal Genome Project 
(PGP), revolutionizing the relationship between researchers and research 
subjects in the areas of valid consent, veracity and participation, transparency, 
and the ongoing participation of the subject.201 The PGP “aim[ed] to sequence 
the genotypic and phenotypic information of 100,000 informed volunteers and 
display it publicly online in an extensive public database.”202 Open consent 
implies that research participants accept that any data given is shared in a public 
access database, they have no guarantees regarding anonymity or privacy, their 
 
 193. Id. 
 194. Rothstein et al., supra note 106. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. at 163–64. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. at 166 tbl.2. 
 199. Id.  
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. 
 202. LATANYA SWEENEY ET AL., IDENTIFYING PARTICIPANTS IN THE PERSONAL GENOME PROJECT BY NAME 
1 (2013). 
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participation might involve risks to themselves or families, they get no direct 
benefit individually from the study, and ongoing participation in the study is 
required.203 While the participant may technically withdraw at any time, 
complete removal of information from the public domain may not be possible.204  
“The moral goal of open consent is to obtain valid consent by effectuating 
veracity as a precondition for valid consent and effectuating voluntariness 
through strict eligibility criteria, as a precondition for substantial informed 
consent.”205 PGP employed several innovative features to ensure that 
participants had the special knowledge required to truly understand the risks of 
sharing genetic information and making sensitive health information accessible 
to the public.206 The participants in the first study cohort were required to “have 
a master’s degree in genetics or equivalent, and [were] presented from the outset 
with a straightforward description of the risks of participation and the harm they 
might experience as a consequence of the loss of privacy through public 
disclosure of identification.”207 In addition, the study employed “[i]nteractive 
online education and an entrance test . . . [ensured] valid consent [when] the 
participation [opened] to the broader public.”208  
Since the researchers recognized that the “promise of secrecy” is not one 
that can be kept in the realm of genetic research, transparency was deemed “the 
hallmark of [the] project.”209 The PGP found that the open consent model 
allowed its research participants to cultivate a sense of community through their 
collective involvement; this was a huge benefit stemming from the fact that 
“participants [were] no longer isolated.”210 Participants in PGP were not 
promised any direct benefit from their participation; “a high degree of 
‘information altruism’ [was] required, thereby introducing a strong moral 
motive.”211 This model supports the idea of a “solidarity” approach to biobank 
governance proposed by Barbara Prainsack and Alena Buyx.212 Several ideas 
from this approach to biobank governance ring true: “recogni[zing] people’s 
willingness to participate in a public research biobank, and [a] stronger emphasis 
on harm mitigation.”213 “It also allows moving beyond overly restrictive and 
burdensome, exclusively autonomy-based governance towards governance that 
 
 203. Lunshof et al., supra note 19, at 409 box 3. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Madeleine P. Ball et al., Harvard Personal Genome Project: Lessons from Participatory Public 
Research, 6 GENOME MED. 1, 2 (2014). 
 207. Lunshof et al., supra note 19, at 409. 
 208. Id. at 410. 
 209. Id. at 409. 
 210. Ball et al., supra note 206, at 5. 
 211. Lunshof et al., supra note 19, at 410 (footnote omitted); see also Ball et al., supra note 206, at 2. 
 212. See generally Prainsack & Buyx, supra note 178. Solidarity is a practice or set of practices that 
“manifest[] . . . people’s willingness to carry costs (financial, social, emotional, or otherwise) to assist others.” 
Id. at 75 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 213. Id. at 71. 
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is reflective of people’s willingness to accept costs and to assist others.”214 
However, this model asks too much of people too quickly. Therefore, a dynamic 
consent model is the most practical, yet feasible type of consent model for the 
big data age because it promises the participant control over the scope of data 
sharing, instead of relying solely on his altruism, while technology offerings 
researchers an easy way to elicit renewed consent on an ongoing basis.  
Dynamic consent is a “proposal that seeks to continually communicate 
with participants and allow for individually tailored control.”215 It entails getting 
initial consent from participants and following up with “electronic notification 
of each proposed use of [the participant’s] specimens and data, and participants 
can opt out of any specific research use.”216 Critics argue that obtaining dynamic 
consent is not feasible for biobanks that lack the resources needed to handle the 
administrative burdens that the dynamic consent model imposes.217 It is 
understandable that the development of an interactive platform for participants 
and the initial set up of profiles for millions of samples is a huge endeavor. But 
these are worthwhile undertakings that stand to accommodate scientific research 
and increase administrative efficiency in the long run by providing a common 
link between data sets, creating an invaluable resource for scientists, and 
allowing for automation of menial tasks such as sending notifications to research 
participants and getting renewed consent.218 Indeed, an automated system could 
be set up under either an opt-in or an opt-out consent model, depending on the 
level of risk or according to current regulations.219  
The dynamic consent system addresses, and provides a platform for solving 
many complicated ethical and moral issues surrounding invalid consent. To that 
point, the absence of a major public uproar concerning the use of DNA samples 
likely stems from a general lack of knowledge about common practices within 
the scientific community, which allows DNA to be used and re-used over and 
over without any additional consent. This needs to change before people find 
out about these practices in a way that makes them feel deceived, disrespected, 
or otherwise aggrieved, which could result in backlash against the scientific 
community and cause the whole system to crash. Fostering extreme distrust in 
science could cause irreparable harm.  
The use of dynamic consent would provide transparency, letting people 
know how their data is being used; autonomy, whether through an opt-in or opt-
out model, letting people decide if they want to participate; fosters a 
collaborative environment where people feel like they are voluntary participants 
in research contributing to the common good; and it relieves researchers of some 
of the ethical responsibility because it gives participants the information to make 
 
 214. Id.  
 215. Dove, supra note 11, at 680. 
 216. Rothstein et al., supra note 106, at 166 tbl. 2. 
 217. Dove, supra note 11, at 680. 
 218. See Rothstein et al., supra note 106, at 166. 
 219. Id. 
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their own decisions regarding participation. Moreover, rather than creating 
unmanageable privacy concerns, a dynamic consent system would call attention 
to the inadequacies in privacy regulation, which has been quickly outpaced by 
biotechnological advances, by creating concrete problems and a platform on 
which to solve them.220  
B.  HEALTH DATA AS SENSITIVE PERSONAL DATA  
A dynamic consent platform is consistent with a theory of whole person 
data management. In the age of big data—an age in which people are creating 
an ever-increasing amount of data about themselves and commercial data 
refineries are collecting and capitalizing on the information contained therein—
health data should be treated as a particularly sensitive type of personal data, and 
regulated under one overarching privacy framework. In the United States, the 
idea of treating genetic information as personally identifiable has not been 
widely accepted or put into practice.221 The HIPAA Omnibus Rule considers 
genetic information as “personally identifiable” but the traditional elements of 
PHI still must be met.222 On the other hand, the EU has recognized the 
heightened sensitivity of both health data and genetic health data and considers 
genetic data inherently identifiable.223  
Genetic information, including any material that genetic information can 
be derived from, including blood, tissue, or other bodily samples, and including 
DNA sequences or patterns should be treated as inherently identifiable personal 
information. Even if anonymous, the ability to re-identify the source of this 
material now exists, and we have not yet reached the limits on our ability to 
derive more meaning from genetic sequences. If genetic data and biological 
materials are considered inherently identifiable, it then makes sense to treat those 
categories of information as sensitive personal data within a larger privacy 
framework designed to protect the privacy rights of individuals concerning all 
types of data.224  
 
 220. See, e.g., Sutrop, supra note 176, at 538–43 (discussing the Estonia Electronic Health Record which 
demonstrates one such technological platform that provides individuals with transparency about the data 
collected about them and gives them control over the use of that data). 
 221. Rothstein et al., supra note 106, at 167 (“In 2014, the U.S. National Institutes of Health issued a policy 
statement requiring the sharing of genomic data under a broad consent approach as a condition of the funding.”). 
However, a proposal for a similar change to the common rule was rejected. It would have required “the 
prospective collection of any tissues (even if deidentified) [to] require consent.” Id. 
 222. FOLEY & LARDNER LLP, supra note 128. 
 223. See generally Ana Gomes, Fundamental Rights and Big Data: Striking a Balance, PARLIAMENT MAG. 
(Mar. 17, 2017), https://www.theparliamentmagazine.eu/articles/opinion/fundamental-rights-and-big-data-
striking-balance (discussing the non-legislative resolution she drafted for the European Parliament about “the 
fundamental rights implications of big data: privacy, data protection, non-discrimination, security and law-
enforcement”). 
 224. In the United States, there has been some reference to health information generally as sensitive data or 
identifiable sensitive data in legislation proposals, but no explicit reference to genetic information fitting within 
that definition. 21st Century Cures Act, 42 U.S.C. § 241(d) (Supp. IV 2016). The 21st Century Cures Act 
70.4-CECH (DO NOT DELETE) 4/2/2019  1:24 PM 
882 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 70:851 
C.  BIG DATA APPROACH TO PRIVACY 
Operating under the assumption that genetic information is health 
information and health information is data about a unique person, then the 
management and protection of all data can properly be addressed within the big 
data framework. “Most definitions [of big data] reflect the growing 
technological ability to capture, aggregate, and process an ever-greater volume, 
velocity, and variety of data.”225 If you assume that all people are generating 
countless amounts of data, and some data is inherently more sensitive than other 
data, and once you delineate the categories of sensitivity, an overarching 
regulation or set of regulation is the best way to ensure that all data is accounted 
for and protected. The creation and sharing of health data is becoming more akin 
to the creation of other personal informational data, “real-time ‘flows’ of data” 
as opposed to “point-to-point ‘data transfers’” as originally “envisioned in data 
privacy regulation.”226 Theories for reform of big data provide ways to keep 
afloat the essential principles of informed consent. In the post-privacy era, the 
United States needs to take a comprehensive big data approach to maximize the 
privacy protection of the individual without hindering scientific advancement—
interestingly, whether completely successful or not, what the EU has done with 
its implementation of the GDPR. 
1. Data Subject Rights Model 
The GDPR is only one implementation of ideas to increase transparency 
and individual choice when it comes to this huge generation of data. Andreas 
Weigend, in his book Data for the People, argues for an increase in transparency 
and agency, or autonomy, to allow all individuals to become data literate.227 He 
 
requires certificates of confidentiality for NIH funded research or by application by the participant for 
“identifiable, sensitive information.” Id. Section 241(d) defines “identifiable, sensitive information” as 
information “(A) through which an individual is identified; or (B) for which there is at least a very small risk, as 
determined by current scientific practices or statistical methods, that some combination of the information, a 
request for the information, and other available data sources could be used to deduce the identity of an 
individual,” the second definition leaving open the possibility of genetic information falling within that category. 
Id.  
  The FTC referred to health information specifically as “sensitive information” within its big data 
protection framework: “Sensitive data deserves stronger protections than other kinds of personal data, including 
more rigorous security and more robust notice and choice before collection.” Julie Brill, Comm’r, FTC, Keynote 
Address at the Columbia University Data Science Institute Symposium on “Data on a Mission: Transforming 
Privacy, Cities, and Finance”: Navigating the “Trackless Ocean”: Privacy and Fairness in Big Data Research 
and Decision Making (Apr. 1, 2015). See generally Ohm, supra note 84 (proposing to classify genetic 
information as “sensitive information,” develop a multi-factor test for assessing sensitivity, and recommending 
a new “threat modeling” approach to assessing risk of harm in privacy law which borrows from the computer 
security literature and extends the idea of sensitive information to other unprotected types of personal data). 
 225. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BIG DATA: SEIZING OPPORTUNITIES, PRESERVING VALUES 2 (2014), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/big_data_privacy_report_may_1_2014.pdf. The 
White House, under the Obama Administration, released the Big Data Privacy Report based on the findings of 
the Big Data and Privacy Working Group Review. Id. 
 226. Dove, supra note 11, at 682. 
 227. See WEIGEND, supra note 12. 
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proposes six data rights to “empower people to make better decisions” regarding 
data created about themselves: (1) the right to access data, (2) the right to inspect 
data refineries, (3) the right to amend data, (4) the right to blur data out, (5) the 
right to experiment with the refineries, (6) the right to port data.228 The six data 
rights—two transparency and four autonomy rights229—closely resemble the 
seven data privacy principles recognized in the GDPR and are even reminiscent 
of the Belmont Report’s bioethics principles. Weigend’s post-privacy paradigm 
for big data provides an excellent framework for thinking about how to organize 
a system to protect health data privacy rights.  
A significant problem with informed consent in the United States is that 
participants are ignorant as to the true scope of how their information will be 
used. The scientific community currently informs potential subjects as though 
they are educated researchers themselves and already understand the basic risks. 
However, the public at large likely has very little idea of how tissue samples and 
the information generated from research of them are handled. Weigend describes 
this as “data illiteracy” and advocates for widespread data literacy in 
understanding the methods of collection and the uses data.230 The concept holds 
true for genetic data.  
Data literacy and true informed consent require research participants to 
know germane facts about scientific practices, including: (1) leftover samples 
taken during medical procedures are considered a donation to the hospital and 
can be de-identified and used in research;231 (2) once tissue is separated from 
your body (abandoned) you lose property rights in it;232 (3) leftover tissue or the 
data from analysis of that tissue can, and probably will, be shared with other 
researchers; (4) your samples will likely be de-identified to protect your identity 
and private health information, but HIPAA privacy protection does not extend 
to secondary research done with de-identified samples or information in the 
public domain; (5) there are no restrictions on sharing de-identified samples 
even though re-identification is possible; and (6) the risks of research 
participation that can be told today are just some of the risks we might know 
tomorrow. 
While transparency alone could potentially scare off volunteers, the Six 
Data Rights approach may facilitate a trusting relationship between the scientific 
community and research participants after the initial shock in discovering the 
 
 228. Id. at 6–11. 
 229. Id. 
 230. Id. at 34. 
 231. Kayte Spector-Bagdady, The Privacy Debate over Research with Your Blood and Tissue, 
CONVERSATION (Jan. 25, 2017, 7:49 PM), http://theconversation.com/the-privacy-debate-over-research-with-
your-blood-and-tissue-71523.  
 232. See Wash. Univ. v. Catalona, 490 F.3d 667 (8th Cir. 2007) (ruling against patients who wanted to 
transfer their donated samples with the investigator to another university to continue the desired research); Moore 
v. Regents of the Univ. of California, 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990) (holding that patient did not have a property 
right in his tissue after removed). 
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knowledge gap. If participants have access to the data generated about them, 
they can learn what they want in the amount they want, they can correct incorrect 
data, and they can see for what other studies their data might be used, so 
participants can feel like partners contributing to science and discovery rather 
than exploited test subjects.  
2.  The 2018 California Consumer Privacy Act  
The passage of the 2018 California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) is a big 
step toward embracing this all-inclusive privacy regime, largely influenced by 
the GDPR data subject rights model though just on a state scale.233 The CCPA 
sets out new regulations for the protection and processing of “personal 
information” of California residents.234 “Personal information” is defined as any 
“information that . . . relates to . . . a particular consumer or household.”235 This 
definition appears to broadly protect all non-public information that is capable 
of being associated directly or indirectly with a particular consumer or 
household,236 a broader definition than the term “personal data” under the 
GDPR, which only protects “any information relating to an identified or 
identifiable natural person.”237  
Although the CCPA uses slightly different terminology than the GDPR, it 
follows a very similar model setting out rights for “consumers” to protect their 
“personal information.”238 The new rights afforded under the CCPA give 
consumers a level of transparency and access to their data not offered by the 
former privacy laws. The five central individual rights are: (1) the right to know 
what personal information is being collected about oneself; (2) the right to know 
whether one’s personal information is sold or disclosed and to whom; (3) the 
right to say no to the sale of one’s personal information (the right to opt-out of 
data collection and processing); (4) the right to access one’s own personal 
information; and (5) the right to be free from discrimination in exercising of 
one’s privacy rights.239 Now California just needs to work out the kinks in its 
law and implement a system that can handle giving its consumer data subjects 
all of these rights (and of course hop on board with classifying genetic data as 
 
 233. Purvi G. Patel et al., The 2018 California Consumer Privacy Act: California Scraps Ballot Initiative 
and Passes Sweeping Data Privacy Regulation, MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP (June 29, 2018), 
https://www.mofo.com/resources/publications/180629-california-consumer-privacy-act-2018.html. Before the 
January 1, 2020 effective date, we can expect to see “technical fixes and substantive amendments” from 
negotiations between businesses and the legislature that will impact the CCPA’s scope and its interpretation. Id. 
 234. Lothar Determann, Analysis: The California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, INT’L ASS’N PRIVACY 
PROFS. (July 2, 2018), https://iapp.org/news/a/analysis-the-california-consumer-privacy-act-of-2018/#. 
 235. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(o)(1) (West 2018). 
 236. Id. § 1798.140(o)(2). 
 237. GDPR, supra note 119, art. 4(1). 
 238. California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, A.B. 375, 2018 Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 2(i) (Cal. 2018) (an 
act to add Title 1.81.5 (commencing with Section 1798.100) to Part 4 of Division 3 of the Civil Code, relating 
to privacy). 
 239. Id. 
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inherently identifiable personal information) to be on its way to implementing a 
big data approach to genetic privacy law. 
While the GDPR provides a good starting place for thinking about the 
problems inherent in data privacy and especially the privacy of highly sensitive 
genetic data, it does not solve every problem and it was not designed to tackle 
the unique problems of genetic data specifically. Its data rights model provides 
a good framework for the next generation to create a system that allows 
participants to have some control over information generated about them which 
has the potential to dramatically influence their lives. If we use technology to 
create a dynamic platform to engage every person as a partner to contribute to 
the genetic research revolution, we can use technology to advance technology 
rather than allow fear of technology to stagnate its advancement. 
CONCLUSION 
There are approaches to advancing U.S. privacy and informed consent 
regulations that will allow the law to keep pace with scientific development 
while protecting an individual’s unique-biodata and at the same time fostering 
rather than burdening the future of medicine. With the rapid expansion and 
development of biotechnology, both privacy concerns and the potential harmful 
uses of human genome data cannot be overlooked by the United States for much 
longer and soon a wholly new framework will be required to provide participants 
with adequate informed consent consistent with our society’s ethical values. The 
EU holds a more encompassing view of privacy and has classified more 
information as sensitive health data deserving of greater protection. In 
developing its future privacy framework, the United States should embrace the 
EU’s data subject rights model to create and implement a holistic approach to 
data privacy regulation. Further, the United States should look to dynamic 
consent models and technology to facilitate its implementation. 
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